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Abstract 
Earnings conference calls represent an important communication channel between managers and 
investors. We examine the impact of weather-induced mood on manager behavior during these 
calls. Using a large sample of earnings conference calls from 2006 to 2017, we find managers 
speak more negatively and with less (more) quantitative information (uncertainty) when local 
weather conditions are bad. We further identify that this negative relation is less pronounced for 
CFOs than CEOs. Financial expertise mitigates negative behavior bias induced by weather and 
we confirm with subgroups of CEOs with previous financial experience. We document a 
significantly negatively market reaction to weather-induced behavior that cannot be explained by 
existing textual analysis methods. Our results remain significant after adding controls for investor 
mood, separating firms into those from big and small states, mediation tests, firm fixed effects, 
and propensity score matching. Taken together, our findings suggest that exogenous effects of 
bad weather significantly impact manager behavior that the market views negatively. 
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Mood is an essential component in determining both human behavior and economic 
activities. Keynes (1936) investigates firm level investments under economic uncertainty, and 
finds mood is the reason why investment diverges from optimal levels. In more recent work, 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) attribute recessions to negative sentiment from individuals. Previous 
research in finance and economics also demonstrates that decisions made by important economic 
actors are influenced by emotion (e.g. Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; 
Goetzmann et.al., 2014; deHann, Masden, and Piotrowski, 2017). For instance, deHann et.al. 
(2017) show that the mood of equity analysts affects the speed of response to an earnings 
announcement. We follow this stream of literature by looking at an important economic actor in 
firm decisions– top executives. In particular, we suggest that managerial mood will influence 
executives’ behavior such as the language used during earnings conference calls. The literature 
on managerial mood suggests that managerial decisions are highly influenced by emotions such 
as being overly optimistic or pessimistic. For example, Antoniou et al. (2017) find pessimistic 
managers who are influenced by extreme negative event temporarily reduce R&D expenditures, 
reduce long-term leverage, and increase cash holdings.  
Despite the potential role that managerial mood plays in the decision making, it is difficult 
to measure managerial mood directly since it is unobservable. To address this difficulty, existing 
research implies that local sunshine level has a significant impact on an individual's mood but is 
also orthogonal to the economic environment (Chhaochharia et.al., 2017). Scott (2007) 
investigates the relationship between daily mood and daily sunshine and finds sunshine to be a 
crucial factor in mood adjustment. This relationship has also been analyzed in the neurobiology 
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literature. Spindelegger et al. (2012) suggest that the level of serotonin, which is associated with 
happiness and elevated emotional states in human’s mind, will vary with levels of sunlight.  
Using a sample of 57,374 earnings conference call transcripts for U.S. based companies 
from 2006 to 2017, we seek to answer the following two questions: how does weather-induced 
mood change the content/tone of top executives during an earnings conference call and is any 
weather-induced change captured by market prices?  There are several important advantages to 
using earnings conference calls to measure weather-induced behavioral changes. First, the time 
of an earnings conference call is usually set in advance which means the date must be decided at 
least several days before the meeting. This presetting characteristic ensures the event date is 
unrelated to weather conditions. Secondly, the conference call lasts no more than one day which 
improves weather identification. Third, an earnings conference call typically contains a Q&A 
session between managers and analysts which a manager cannot prepare in advance, and we can 
measure weather-induced behavior change in near real-time.  
 Following the existing literature in measuring the impact of sunshine on mood, we use 
seasonally-adjusted local sky coverage to construct our primary measure of weather-induced 
mood (Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; deHann, Masden, and Piotrowski, 2017). 
To be specific, we measure the average daytime (from 6 am to 6 pm) cloud cover of all weather 
stations within a 50 miles radius of a firm’s headquarter on the earnings conference call date. 
Then, we further deseasonalize the weather measurement by adjusting for weekly mean cloud 
cover (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). Finally, we separate weather into two categories- good 
weather and bad weather- by the level of cloud coverage. 
Prior research (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2017; Chen et al.,2017b) has established that 
managerial mood will change an executive’s perception and confidence level for the company. 
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Davis et.al. (2015) concluded that earnings conference calls contain information related not only 
to firm’s fundamental but also to manager-specific components. Zhou (2014) also mentions that 
a manager will choose to talk more about the external environment in the earnings conference 
call when firm performance is bad. Therefore, managers’ negative mood could affect their 
behavior during an earnings conference call in at least two ways. First, negative mood may alter 
manager tone during the conference call by changing manager's perception of firm future 
performance. Second, any negative feeling will also change the confidence level of a manager by 
decreasing the percentage of quantitative information provided and increasing uncertainty in 
language used during the call. 
We find that, ceteris paribus, mean net tone, measured as the percentage of positive minus 
negative words (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) in the Q&A section, is lower by 5% of the 
mean when weather is bad during the day of an earnings conference call. This evidence suggests 
that severe weather induces manager's negative perception of firm future performance which is 
consistent with the argument in psychology literature that individuals in a bad mood will 
overestimate the probability of negative events (Johnson and Tversky, 1983). To examine 
changes of call content, we focus on both quantitative information and uncertain language. Zhou 
(2017) indicates that the use of numerical content inside an earnings conference call depends on 
managerial confidence. As bad weather generates a more pessimistic view, we predict that the 
percentage of numbers used will decrease and uncertainty words will increase as a result. The 
result is as predicted as the use of numbers significantly decreases by around 2% from the mean 
when weather is bad and the use of uncertainty significant increases by 2%. 
 For our second question, the existing literature demonstrates that the market reacts to 
information inside earnings conference calls (Frankel et al. 1999; Loughran and McDonald, 
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2016). We predict that the market negatively reacts to pessimistic managerial mood from bad 
weather during the call date. The results support our prediction: controlling for net tone and 
quantitative information in the call, we find that bad weather decreases the market reaction 
(cumulative abnormal return from one day before to one day after) by 0.21% which translates 
into an average $20 million market value reduction in firm market capitalization. Although 
fluctuations in cloud cover are likely to capture only a fraction of variation in managerial mood, 
this result suggests that associated mood changes play an economically material role in market 
reaction beyond that which is captured by textual analysis methods in the literature. This result 
holds when (1) controlling for investor mood; (2) examining propensity-score matched pairs; (3) 
controlling for clustering of our sample in some specific states. Previous research demonstrates 
that the tone of disclosure after an earnings announcement also influences PEAD (Feldman et al. 
2010). As such, we also look at the persistence of weather effects on conference calls by 
examining post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We find that the bad weather effect is 
consistently associated with more negative PEAD. 
To confirm net tone and numerical information are the channels between weather conditions 
and market reaction, we employ the Sobel test which is a widely used mediation test in the 
management literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Judd and Kenny, 1981; James and Brett,1984). 
The results confirm that net tone and numerical information are mediators between weather 
conditions and market reaction. Prior research (Keller et.al, 2005) also notes that the weather 
effects on mood may be asymmetrical: the effect of bad weather on mood is more pronounced 
than good weather on mood. We confirm these asymmetric effects in that only poor weather 




As the predictions described above do not distinguish effects on individual executive types, 
we conduct additional tests to examine weather effects on the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and Chief Finance Officer (CFO) respectively. We find a significant (insignificant) relationship 
between the content and tone expressed by CEOs (CFOs) and bad weather. These results support 
Chen et al.’s (2017) argument that financial expertise plays an important role between weather-
induced mood and corporate tax avoidance decisions. Previous research (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Custodio and Metzger, 2014) uses CEOs with previous 
working experience in financial roles to represent financial expertise. As such, we show similar 
insignificant weather effects for CEOs with financial expertise for numbers and uncertainty 
words usage. We also examine other potentially moderating executive characteristics including 
tenure, gender, and age. We find that short-tenured, female, and young executives are less 
affected by weather-induced mood change. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways.  First, our results improve 
our understanding of voluntary disclosure by identifying an additional factor, weather-induced 
mood, which affects information content within earnings conference calls. Consistent with 
previous literature on tone management (Huang et al. 2014), we show that managers not only 
intentionally change tone to influence investors but also inadvertently change tone due to 
weather-induced mood.  
Second, our findings contribute to the growing literature that identifies weather as a channel 
through which mood affects important economic actors’ activities. While the majority of work in 
finance has concentrated on the effects of weather on the stock market (Saunders, 1993; 
Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Goetzmann and Zhu, 2005), recent papers (deHaan et al. 2017; 
Chen et al. 2017a; Chen et al., 2017b) investigate other important economic actors such as 
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analysts and executives. However, none of this previous research shows a clear causal 
relationship between mood and economic outcomes since these prior works use weather-induced 
mood over long time periods.  As far as we know, through the use of earnings conference calls, 
we are the first paper to document the direct effect of weather on managerial mood and its 
impact, distinct from net tone and quantitative information, on financial markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
Section 3 lists our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample selection and construction of our 
weather measurement. Section 5 shows our results. Section 6 presents robustness checks. Section 
7 provides some additional analysis. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Previous research in both psychology and neurobiology has studied the relationship between 
weather conditions and human mood.  In the social psychology literature, the level of sunshine 
has been shown as positively related to an individual’s self-reported mood (Cunningham,1979; 
Schwartz and Clore, 1983).  Parrott and Sabini (1990) further conclude that exposure to cloud 
cover serves as an effective way to elicit an individual’s mood. Sunshine is also an effective 
method to treat depression. Lam et al. (2006) argue that light therapy is an effective way to treat 
many types of mood disturbance and depressive disorders.  
Extensive studies in neurobiology address this relationship by performing blood tests on 
human subjects (Lambert et al., 2002; Spindelegger et al. 2012). Studies find that sunshine 
exposure increases the release of serotonin, which is a monoamine neurotransmitter associated 
with happiness and elevated emotional states. When the amount of sunshine exposure drops, the 
human brain produces more of a hormone called melatonin, which is associated with depression, 
sleepiness, and fatigue. 
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The relationship between mood and behavior is also heavily studied in social psychology 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Isen et al., 1978; Bower, 1981; Johnson and Tversky, 1983; 
Forgas and Bower, 1987). These studies demonstrate that individuals in a good mood tend to 
overestimate the likelihood of positive events and underestimate that of negative events, while 
individuals in a bad mood exhibit the opposite tendency. Carlson et al. (1988) demonstrate that 
bad mood causes people to retrieve negative information from memory. Peterson (2000) further 
provides evidence that individuals are more likely to evaluate targets pessimistically when they 
are in a bad mood. If we combine these two streams of literature, we can form a clear relation 
between weather and an individual's behavior. People in bad weather will retrieve more negative 
information from memory and this negative memory will make people become more pessimistic.   
Consistent with previous literature, studies in finance also document weather effects in 
financial markets. Early studies focus on the influence of weather on stock markets (Saunders, 
1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003) and argue that investors are more pessimistic during 
cloudy days, which leads to lower stock returns. In more recent years, research has shifted focus 
to other important economic actors who have been previously assumed to be rational and exhibit 
less behavioral bias. Cortes, Duchin, and Sosyura (2016) focus on low-level bank financial 
officers and find the approval rate for credit applications is higher during sunny days. They 
attribute this relationship to increased optimism of bank financial officers under better weather 
conditions. Two recent studies focus on the same group of people that we seek to analyze, top 
executives (Chen et al., 2017a; Chen et al., 2017b). Chen et al. (2017b) examine the relationship 
between weather conditions and executive tax avoidance decisions. They find that bad weather 
increases levels of tax avoidance. In Chen et al. (2017a), the authors investigate weather effects 
on managerial earnings forecasts and find that the level of sunshine around corporate 
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headquarters is positively related to management forecast bias. However, this prior research uses 
only long-term weather measurements.1 As a result, these two studies can only provide indirect 
evidence of the relationship between weather conditions and executive decisions or behavior.  
Using earnings conference call data and a short estimation window, we offer more direct 
evidence of this relationship. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
Our hypotheses are built around two primary research questions: how does weather-induced 
mood influence managers’ behavior during earnings conference calls and does the market react 
to weather-induced behavior changes? For measuring behavioral changes during earnings 
conference calls, we use three communication measures: net tone, numerical information usage, 
and uncertainty.   
One of the most frequent measurements extracted from earnings conference calls is net tone 
which represents the sentiment that is expressed by call participants from the company and 
external analysts (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Existing research shows that the tone of an 
earnings conference call is significantly influenced by manager-specific tendencies to be 
optimistic or pessimistic (Davis et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2014). If bad weather makes an 
individual become more pessimistic, then, ceteris paribus, the manager will use more negative 
words when speaking during an earnings conference call. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Bad weather is negatively correlated with net tone by managers during earnings conference 
calls. 
                                                            
1 Chen et al. (2017b) use yearly weather measurement and Chen et al. (2017a) use the average daily sky cover over a 
14-day window proceeding the earnings forecast announcement date. 
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The second set of hypotheses are related to the confidence level of managers during earnings 
conference calls. The first type of information we want to focus on is numerical information 
provided by managers. Compared with qualitative information, quantitative information tends to 
be more precise and more difficult to change in the future (Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2015). 
Thus, numerical information in earnings conference calls embed more litigation and reputational 
risks than other less precise information. Zhou (2017) also argues that the percentage of 
quantitative information represents a manager's confidence for future firm performance. In terms 
of confidence level, we can also measure the uncertainty that managers express during an 
earnings conference call. As their confidence level decreases, managers will express more 
uncertainty in their words. If managers become more pessimistic during bad weather, they will 
be less willing to bear risk by stating less quantitative information and less willing to express 
confidence in their words spoken by increasing the level of uncertainty. We hypothesize that:  
H2: Bad weather is negatively correlated with the use of numerical information by managers 
during earnings conference calls. 
H3: Bad weather is positively correlated with the use of uncertainty words by managers during 
earnings conference calls. 
For the second question regarding market reaction, previous research (Davis et al., 2015; 
Huang et al. 2014) has demonstrated that the market reacts to manager specific tone which is not 
related to firm fundamentals within an earnings conference call. Controlling for the level of tone 
and numerical content, we rely on our empirical results to determine the market reaction to bad 
weather during earnings conference calls. As a result, we hypothesize that:.  
H4: Bad weather leads to a negative stock market reaction on the earnings conference call date. 
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On the contrary, if investors know that managerial tone or numerical information are 
influenced by local weather conditions, the market is not expected to react to this change as these 
changes do not carry incremental value relevant information.  
4. Data 
Our analysis employs data from several sources. Our initial sample consists of all earnings 
conference call transcripts from Capital IQ from 2006 through 2017. We merge earnings 
conference call data2 with weather data from the Integrated Surface Database (ISD), which is 
available from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).3  
The ISD database contains hourly weather observations such as cloud cover, temperature, 
and sea pressure etc. from 1901 to 2017. As the focus of our study is U.S. firms, we collect the 
data from all active weather stations located in the U.S.4 The ISD database also provides the 
latitude and longitude coordinates of each weather station which makes the calculation of 
distance between weather station and firm headquarter possible. 
We also obtain firm financial and analyst coverage information used to construct the control 
variables from Compustat and Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), respectively. For 
individual executive speech during earnings conference calls, we also use Execucomp to identify 
the position of each speaker with in the firm. We drop all firms which are headquartered outside 
of the United States and limit our sample to all conference calls with available weather and 
                                                            
2 Firm headquarters information is from Capital IQ and location changes in headquarters are rare (roughly 150 
headquarter changes for the whole sample period). 
3 ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/noaa  
4 We define a weather station as active if the station is operational during our sample period and provides the cloud 
cover measurement. The average number of concurrently active stations in our study is approximately 3600. 
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control variables.5 To be specific, we require each firm have available financial information in 
Compustat and stock price information from CRSP. For analyst coverage information, we 
include both firms with and without analyst coverage in our sample.6 Since earnings conference 
call data in Capital IQ are available widely beginning in 2006, we restrict our sample period to 
2006-2017 and obtain a final sample of 57,374 firm-quarter level observations.7 To mitigate the 
effect of the outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
4.1 Weather-Induced Mood Measurement 
We follow prior research by measuring weather-induced mood using local cloud cover (e.g., 
Saunders 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; DeHaan et al. 2017). The original cloud cover 
data from ISD is hourly sky coverage in oktas, where 0 oktas cover is a clear sky and 8 oktas 
cover is reported as full cloud coverage.8 We follow previous literature by taking the average of 
hourly cloud cover data during daytime which is from 6 am to 6 pm (DeHaan et al. 2017). To 
overcome the seasonality of cloud cover in each city, we use the same method as Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003) to seasonally-adjust our cloud data. We first calculate the average cloud cover 
for each week of a given year for a given city in our sample period. Then, we take the average of 
the weekly mean in each city for the whole sample period to generate the historical weekly mean 
cloud cover during our sample period. At last, we subtract the historical weekly mean from our 
daily cloud cover measurement in that city on the day of the earnings conference call to obtain 
                                                            
5 The omitted firms are not statistically different from firms in our final sample with respect to any of the variables 
in Table 1. In untabulated specifications, we replicate our regression results setting DCloud Cover to 0 for firms 
without weather data only to find similar results. 
6 For firms without analyst coverage, we set all analyst related control variables to 0. Untabulated results are similar 
when we use only firms with analyst coverage. 
7 There are 5,389 firm-quarters (roughly 10% of our whole sample) without analyst coverage in I/B/E/S database. 
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okta  
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the adjusted cloud cover where a higher number means poorer weather conditions. We defined 
this deseasonalized cloud cover measurement as Dcloud Cover.  
After seasonally adjusting the cloud cover data, we match headquarters information for each 
firm with our Dcloud Cover data from all available weather stations within a 50-mile range of 
each firm’s headquarters.9 We determine headquarters locations from Capital IQ and weather 
station data from ISD provides geographic coordinates information.10 The distance is calculated 
based on the longitude-latitude coordinates of the weather station and the central coordinates of 
the ZIP code for each firm. We then take the mean for all the weather stations with available 
cloud cover data in a 50-mile range around the firm’s headquarters. To obtain an indicator 
variable for bad weather, we define Bad Weather equal to one when Dcloud Cover is larger than 
the median in our sample.11 
One potential concern of the validity of this deseasonalized cloud cover data is that it may 
cluster in some specific city or state. In Figure 1, we plot a histogram of two specific cities and 
corresponding states which we presume to have the best (Miami) and worst (Seattle) weather 
conditions across the United States. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
As you can see from the histograms and corresponding tables, differences are not 
statistically significant. At the city level, Dcloud Cover is more concentrated around 0 for Miami 
and Dcloud Cover is more disperse for Seattle but the difference is not statistically significant. If 
                                                            
9 Our results are robust to choosing 25 mile or 75 mile ranges.  
10 Capital IQ provides the ZIP code for each firm’s headquarters information, then we use ZIP code to obtain 
coordinates data from United States Census (https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html) 
11 Our results still hold when we use a continuous variable for cloud cover measurement. 
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we look into the state level, the difference becomes even smaller. All of these results support the 
validity of our seasonally adjusted cloud cover measurement. 
4.2 Mood-Related Behavior 
An advantage of our approach is that we can observe and track more direct mood-related 
behavior during earnings conference calls. In particular, earnings conference calls provide the 
following advantages when compared to other executive activities such as tax avoidance and 
managerial forecasts. First, the date of the conference call is usually determined in advance 
which is uncorrelated to abnormal weather conditions. Second, the conference call occurs within 
a single day which gives us a clear, concise window for measurement of weather conditions. 
Third, the majority of conference call participants are communicated through audio only which 
mitigates any effects of information from facial or body expressions. All of these provide a clear 
setting for testing the relationship between weather and executive behavior.  
Consistent with previous literature in finance and accounting in measuring the tone within 
earnings conference calls (e.g., Huang et al., 2014; Davis et.al., 2015), we rely on the Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) finance-oriented dictionaries to calculate net tone as a percentage of 
positive words minus the percentage of negative words and calculate uncertainty as a percentage 
of uncertainty words in the earnings conference call.12 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 =







                                                            
12 We also use Harvard IV-4 dictionaries to construct a similar measurement. These regression results are similar to 
those using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary. 
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We only use net tone or uncertainty words from manager responses in the Q&A section of each 
conference call which has shown to be less prepared in advance by previous studies (Allee and 
DeAngelis, 2015; Davis et al., 2015). The mean of our Net Tone in Q&A and % Uncertainty in 
Q&A measurement is 0.69% and 0.91% which is similar to previous studies examining earnings 
conference call content (Call et al., 2017; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
For the measurement of quantitative information, we use a similar method described by 
Zhou (2017). We count the number of numeric phrases in each transcript and exclude whole 
numbers from 1950 to 2020 to avoid including mention of years in the transcripts. The formula 
we use is: 
% 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
× 100 
where Total Numbers is calculated using the method above and Total Words is the total count of 
all words in each transcript.13 Similar to the motivation for only using net tone in the Q&A 
section, we also use numbers present only in management responses within the Q&A section. 
We use % Numbers in Q&A as our variable to measure the percentage of quantitative 
information inside each earnings conference call. The mean for % Numbers in Q&A is 1.5% 
percent which is similar to Zhou’s (2017) measurement.  
4.3 Other Control Variables 
We follow prior literature in selecting control variables (e.g., Davis et al., 2015; Zhou, 2017; 
Huang et al., 2014). We include two types of variables that will influence market reaction and 
executive language during earnings conference calls. The first type of control is related to firm 
status and financial performance in a given quarter. We control for Accruals which is calculated 
                                                            
13 The total words measurement in Loughran and McDonald (2011) does not include numbers.  
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as accruals relative to total assets, market capitalization (Ln(Size)), Book to Market ratio, Return 
on Assets, Momentum which is calculated as the firm’s lagged cumulative 12-month stock return, 
and Negative Earnings which is an indicator variable that equals one when the firm reports a 
negative earnings result in that quarter. The second type of control relates to pressure from 
outside stakeholders such as investors and analysts. The variables are Surprise Earnings14 which 
is the difference between actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast divided by the standard 
deviation of analyst forecast, number of analysts following the company in that quarter 
(Ln(Analysts)), number of earnings estimates made by analysts during that quarter 
(Ln(Revisions)), and an indicator variable to distinguish whether the firm met earnings 
expectation in that quarter (Meet Expectations). 
In addition, we follow Chen et.al. (2018) by controlling for the time of day in which the 
conference call takes place. They conclude that the tone of conference call deteriorates markedly 
over the course of the day, and they attribute this negative relation to a decrease in energy level 
of executives. As a result, we create a dummy variable (Afternoon) to distinguish calls held 
before or after 12 noon. In our study, we find there are less than 40% of calls that begin in the 
afternoon which is similar to the number reported by Chen et al. (2018). Detailed definitions of 
all variables are provided in Appendix I. 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays our sample summary statistics. Our variables are consistent with previous 
research (Davis et al., 2015; Zhou, 2017). The mean for Dcloud Cover is near zero, and its 
standard deviation is 2.59 which is similar to Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003). Further, the mean 
                                                            
14 Our results are similar if we define Surprise Earnings by standardizing the difference between actual and 
forecasted earnings by the consensus forecast rather than the forecast standard deviation. 
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cumulative abnormal return is around 0.105%, the mean earnings surprise is 0.784, and the mean 
momentum return is 0.126. On average, our sample has 7.39 analysts following the firm and the 
mean number of revisions for each analyst is around 1.10. Our sample observations also have an 
average log-transformed firm size of 7.41 which translates into $1.65 billion and an average 
book to market ratio of 0.566. In addition, 8.9% of the observations report a loss in a given 
quarter and 67.8% of the observations meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast.15 
[Insert Table 1] 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
We begin examining our research questions by conducting a univariate analysis of the 
relationship between weather conditions and mood-related behavior during earnings conference 
calls. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the difference between net tone in good weather and bad 
weather is 0.058% which equals a 9% increase, and this number is also statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This significant difference is also seen for uncertainty words. There is a 0.03% 
difference in the usage of uncertainty words between the weather condition states. With respect 
to quantitative information, we can see that the percentage in good weather is 4% higher relative 
to that in bad weather. This number is also statistically significant at 1% level. We observe that 
the Q&A of earnings calls are longer in bad weather than in good weather providing preliminary 
evidence that executives are more willing to talk more when weather-induced mood is negative.  
[Insert Table 2] 
                                                            
15 The correlation between Meet Expectations and Negative Earnings is -0.23. Also, correlations between Surprise 
Earnings and Meet Expectation or Negative Earnings are only 0.011 and 0.003, respectively. 
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Results in Panel A of Table 2 provide initial results that weather can affect manager 
behavior during earnings conference calls, but other variables are also different between firms 
during good and bad weather as shown in Panel B of Table 2. For market reaction, we use 
cumulative abnormal return between -1 days to +1 days around the call. We see that the 
difference is -0.018% but is not significant. The insignificance is likely due to differences in firm 
characteristics. Among these differences, firms in bad weather tend to be larger, have a higher 
(lower) percentage of firm-quarters that meet market expectations (have negative earnings), have 
more estimate revisions, higher book to market ratios, and are more likely to hold calls in the 
afternoon. Many of these differences are likely to influence net tone, uncertainty, and number 
usage. To control for these time-variant firm variables, we use a multivariate regression analysis 
to examine the relationship between weather and behavior. In addition to firm and quarter fixed 
effects, we also use a matched-sample analysis to further test our hypotheses. 
5.2 Weather and Mood-Related Behavior 
As stated earlier, we predict that bad weather will influence executive mood-related 
behavior by decreasing net tone and numerical information and increasing the percentage of 
uncertainty words spoken by managers. We test these predictions using the following OLS 
model: 
𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖    (1) 
where the dependent variable, Behavior, is alternatively net tone (Net Tone in Q&A), percentage 
of quantitative information (% Numbers in Q&A), or percentage of uncertainty words (% 
Uncertainty in Q&A) spoken by management in the conference call Q&A section. To control for 
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time invariant unobservable firm characteristics and times series variation, we also include firm 
and calendar quarter (e.g., first quarter, second quarter, etc.) fixed effects.16 
[Insert Table 3] 
The results reported in Table 3 show both the weather effects on net tone, which is presented 
in columns (1) and (2), and on the percentage of quantitative information which is shown in 
columns (3) and (4). The last two columns report results for uncertainty words usage. We use 
two model specifications for the three types of mood-related behavior. In column (1), (3), and 
(5), we regress net tone, percentage of numerical information, or the percentage of uncertainty 
words usage on an indicator variable for bad weather and include both firm and quarter fixed 
effects. In the remaining columns we further add all of our control variables.17 
The coefficient for Bad Weather is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
across columns (1) to (4) and is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (5) 
and (6) of Table 3. These results are consistent with our hypotheses which state that bad weather 
will decrease net tone and the percentage of quantitative information and will increase the 
percentage of uncertainty in the Q&A section of the call. The result is not only statistically 
significant but also economically significant. Bad Weather decreases Net Tone in Q&A (% 
Numbers in Q&A) from its mean by 5% (2%) when we include control variables and fixed 
effects for both firm and quarter.  Also, Bad Weather increases % Uncertainty by 2%. 
The results for control variables are mainly consistent with prior studies (Davis et al., 2015; 
Zhou, 2017). Specifically, Net Tone for managers is higher for firms with larger size, positive 
                                                            
16 Calendar quarter fixed effects also control for seasonal affective disorder (SAD), which is a recognized medical 
condition in which the shortness of the days in fall and winter leads to depression for some individuals. 
17 In an unreported table, we also replace firm fixed effects with CEO fixed effects. Our results still hold. 
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earnings surprises, and more momentum of return in the past 12 months. Net Tone is lower for 
firms with a higher book to market ratio, more analyst coverage, and when the call is held in the 
afternoon. Similar control variable results are observed when the dependent variable is the 
percentage of quantitative information or uncertainty words. In the next subsection, we focus on 
our second question related to whether the market reacts to these weather-induced behavioral 
changes. 
5.3 Weather and Market Reaction 
If the market determines that tone or percentage of numbers are changed by weather 
conditions which are unrelated to current firm fundamentals, investors will not react to these 
changes if they are rational. However, previous research (Davis et al., 2015; Huang et al. 2014) 
has shown that the market reacts to manager-specific tone even if it is unrelated to firm 
performance. To test whether the market reacts to weather conditions, we employ the following 
regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1, +1] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑄&𝐴 + 𝛽3%𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑄&𝐴 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)
+ 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠) + 𝛽9𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝛽10𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽12𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜖    (2) 
where CAR [-1, +1] is the cumulative abnormal return around the earnings call date. The control 
variables are similar to equation (1) except we add two additional controls: Net Tone and % 
Numbers.18 The results are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4] 
                                                            
18 The reason that we include these two variables, and not uncertainty, is that only these two variables have been 
shown to significantly influence market reaction (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011and Zhou, 2017)  
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We find the coefficient for Bad Weather to be negative and highly significant across all of 
the regression specifications in Table 4. In the first regression, we omit Net Tone in Q&A and % 
Numbers in Q&A as controls. After adding these controls, we observe that the coefficient for bad 
weather is still statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (3). In terms of 
economic significance, bad weather decreases the market reaction by 0.21% which translates into 
a $20 million value reduction from firm mean market value in our sample.  Control variables are 
consistent with prior research. These results provide initial evidence that weather effects firm 
returns in addition to the related changes in tone and percentage of quantitative information in 
earnings conference calls. We use a mediation test to further clarify this relationship. 
5.3.1 Mediation Test 
As we can see from Table 4, the coefficient for Bad Weather decreases in magnitude after 
adding Net Tone in Q&A and % Numbers in Q&A. This may be initial evidence of a mediation 
effect since part of the weather effect is explained by Net Tone in Q&A and % Numbers in Q&A. 
To apply a formal mediation test, we follow previous research (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Judd 
and Kenny, 1981; James and Brett,1984) and the four steps for establishing mediation.19 
[Insert Table 5] 
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the effect of weather on market reaction may be mediated 
by the mediating variable (Net Tone in Q&A or % Numbers in Q&A). To test this relationship, 
we must first show that the causal variable is correlated with the outcome variable which is path 
C in the graph. Then, we also need to demonstrate the correlation between the causal variable 
and the mediator is significant which is path A in the regression model. Third, we need to prove 
                                                            
19 More information can be found on David A. Kenny’s website: http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm  
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that path B is significant by regressing our outcome variable on both the mediator and causal 
variable. Finally, we determine whether the mediator completely or partially mediates the 
relationship between the causal and outcome variable by looking at the significance of the causal 
variable. If the variable is insignificant, the mediation effect should be complete; otherwise, it is 
a partial mediation effect. 







where 𝛼𝑎 is the coefficient of Bad Weather in path A, 𝛿𝑎 is standard error of Bad Weather, 𝛼𝑏is 
the coefficient of Net Tone in Q&A or % Numbers in Q&A in path B, and 𝛿𝑏 the standard error 
of 𝛼𝑏 in path B. The result is shown in Panel C of Table 5. We test the mediation effect for each 
earnings call content variable separately and both are statistically significant. These analyses 
support the argument that net tone and percentage of numbers are mediators for the relationship 
between bad weather and market reaction. Additionally, the coefficient for Bad Weather is still 
significant after controlling for these conference call content variables when we look at the 
column (3) of Table 4.  
This test supports the view that these two call content variables have a partial mediation 
effect on the relationship between bad weather and market reaction. To access the magnitude of 
this mediation effect, we need to compare the coefficient for Bad Weather before and after we 
added the mediator into the regression. In an unreported table, we estimate the mediation effect 
for Net Tone causes a 19% decrease of the Bad Weather indicator variable. The mediation effect 
for % Numbers causes a 2% decrease in of the Bad Weather indicator. Importantly, there is a 
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large percentage of Bad Weather that cannot be explained by these two call content variables and 
represents the direct effect of bad weather on market reaction. 
5.4 Propensity Score Matching 
In this section, we seek to address a potential issue in our univariate analysis table that there 
may be significant differences in firm characteristics between firms that hold earnings calls in 
good and poor weather. To overcome this concern, we adopt a propensity-score matching (PSM) 
method to construct a balanced sample between firms in different weather conditions.  
The first step of this PSM method is to construct the prediction model which is presented in 
Panel A of Table 6. The pseudo R-squared in this model is 0.7% which is low. The low 
predictive power in the first stage means our sample is more likely to represent a random 
subsample of the full population (Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited, 2017). This result supports  
any differences in firm characteristics associated with weather conditions during earnings 
conferences being a random effect and not due to an endogenous choice. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Panel B of Table 6 shows summary statistics for our matched sample. We have matched, 
without replacement, 26,356 firm-quarters observations with a corresponding control observation 
and the matching rate is approximately 92%. The matching result works well since differences 
between our control variables in the treatment and control groups are not statistically significant. 
We also rerun our main regression analysis examining the relationship between weather 
conditions and net tone, percentage of numbers, and market reaction respectively. All of these 
results are shown in Panel C of Table 6. These results are similar to those in Tables 3 and 4 
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which indicates that our results are not driven by any differences in firm characteristics for 
earnings conference calls that occur during good or bad weather. 
5.5 Asymmetric Weather Effect 
In our previous analyses, we follow existing finance literature (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer 
and Shumway, 2003; deHann, Masden, and Piotrowski, 2017) and assume the weather effect on 
executives is symmetric, which means the relationship between the weather effect and the 
weather-induced mood change is linear. However, previous literature (Keller et.al, 2005) notess 
that weather effects on mood may be asymmetrical: the effect of bad weather on mood is more 
pronounced than good weather. Also, an earnings conference call is a voluntary disclosure 
method for the firm to release information to the public. This voluntary characteristic could make 
expressed sentiment positive as a default. As such, we predict that bad weather will have a larger 
effect on manager’s behavior than good weather. 
To test our prediction, we use a similar regression to equation (1) but replace the bad 
weather indicator variables with two indicator variables for weather conditions: Better Weather 
(bottom quartile in Dcloud Cover) and Worse Weather (top quartile in Dcloud Cover).  
[Insert Table 7] 
The first three columns in Table 7 report the results of this test. The magnitude of the 
coefficient for the worse weather indicator variable is larger for net tone, percentage of number 
used, and percentage of uncertainty words used which are shown in columns (1), (2), and (3), 
respectively. This result supports our prediction that bad weather is more pronounced than good 
weather in changing managers’ behavior.  
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We also examine whether the market reaction to weather conditions is symmetric or 
asymmetric. The result is shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 7. The coefficient is significant 
for worse weather in column (4). However, after adding net tone and percentage of numbers used 
in column (5), we observe that the coefficient for Worse Weather decreases and is not different 
from zero.  
6. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks to validate our main findings. The 
first set of robustness checks addresses the role of investor mood. Next, we mitigate the concern 
that our result may be driven by a small group of specific states since the three largest states that 
firms are headquartered in account for more than 36% of our entire sample. 
6.1 Investor Mood 
We consider the possibility that a negative market reaction is not due to changes in 
executives’ mood but due to changes in investor and/or analyst mood. To address this concern, 
we employ two tests by controlling for sweather-induced mood of investors. 
In the first test, we limit our sample to large firms since previous literature shows large firms 
have more geographically dispersed ownership (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). As a result, a 
small firm may have a concentrated investor base which increases the probability that investors 
are near or in the same location as the firm’s headquarters. We define a large firm as larger than 
the median asset size in our sample. The result is shown in column (1) of Table 8. The Bad 
Weather coefficient remains statistically and economically significant.20  
                                                            
20 Untabulated robustness checks using other measures of ownership structure (HHI and institutional ownership 
percentage) yield similar results.  
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[Insert Table 8] 
Since previous studies demonstrate that weather around the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) has a significant influence on stock returns (Saunders,1993; Hirshleifer and 
Shumway,2003), our next robustness check controls for cloud cover level around New York City 
(NYC). The result is shown in column (2) of Table 8 and the coefficient for Dcloud Cover in 
NYC is negative and significant which is consistent with previous research (Saunders, 1993). The 
coefficient for Bad Weather remains negative and significant which is consistent with our 
previous results. Based on these two tests, our results are unlikely to be driven by investor mood 
changes. 
6.2 Major States 
To rule out the concern that our results are driven by specific states, we split our sample into 
two subsamples according to whether the firm is located in one of the largest three states since 
firms in the largest three states (NY, CA, and TX) account for more than 38% of our total 
sample. Column (3) of Table 8 shows the results for the remaining states and column (4) displays 
results for the firms in the largest three states. As one can see from these two columns, the 
coefficient for Bad Weather remains negative and significant in both subsamples.  
7. Additional Analysis 
In this section, we focus on the effect of weather conditions on individual executive roles 
(CEO or CFO) and post-earnings announcement drift. Prior research in psychology suggests that 
the influence of mood on individuals' judgments is more pronounced in ambiguous settings (De 
Vries, Holland, and Witteman, 2008). As the CEO and CFO are responsible for different aspects 
of the conference call, the weather effect on their mood-related behavior may be different. Panel 
A of Table 2 show the initial result that tone and numerical information spoken by CEOs are 
 26 
 
influenced by weather conditions. However, there is no clear relationship for CFOs. In order to 
get a clear relationship, we replace the dependent variable in equation (1) to Net Tone (% 
Numbers or % Uncertainty) for the CEO or CFO in Q&A section respectively and rerun the 
regression analyses accordingly. As the appearance of the CFO (CEO) may influence the 
behavior of CEO (CFO), we further add two indicator variables to represent whether the CEO or 
CFO attends the earnings conference call (CEO Attends and CFO Attends).  
[Insert Table 9] 
In Table 9, we can see that the coefficients for the behavior of CEOs are all statistically 
significant and the sign of the coefficient is similar to our original results for all firm managers. 
The last three regressions in Table 9 are focused on CFO behavior. The coefficient for Bad 
Weather is not statistically significant in any of these three columns. These results indicate that 
CFO behavior is less affected by weather conditions than CEO behavior during earnings 
conference calls.  
7.1 Financial Expertise 
Some existing research argues that financial expertise may play an important role in dealing 
with mood-related behavioral differences. Chen et al. (2017b) argue that the impact of 
managerial mood on tax avoidance is mitigated in firms with more financial expertise within its 
board of directors. Financial knowledge may also help an executive to better understand the 
consequences of what he or she says during an earnings conference call on the firm’s stock price. 
Compared to CEOs, CFOs may have more financial knowledge and perhaps also have a better 
understanding of the consequences of a negative earnings conference call. As a result, we 
hypothesize that differences in weather-induced behavior between a CEO and CFO are due to 
differences in executive financial expertise. To test the validity of this explanation, we focus on 
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CEOs with financial expertise. Custodio and Metzger (2014) define a finance expert CEO as one 
who has previous experience in a finance related role — accountant, CFO, treasurer, or VP in 
finance — or in large auditing firms.21 We gather all data on managers’ characteristics from 
Boardex and use the same definition as Custodio and Metzger (2014). In such, we find 11% of 
our CEO sample has financial expertise. Next, we redo all of the regressions in Table 9 for CEOs 
by separating the whole CEO sample into two subgroups in Table 10: CEOs with financial 
expertise and CEOs without financial expertise. 
 [Insert Table 10] 
The first two columns of Table 10 focus on the Net Tone usage for CEO in Q&A section. 
However, we do not observe any significant difference in the coefficients between financial 
expert CEO and non-financial expert CEO. Column (3) and (4) show that the coefficient for Bad 
Weather is insignificant (significantly negative) for the subgroup of CEOs with (without) 
financial expertise and the difference between the two is also statistically significant. Results are 
similar when we switch our focus on uncertainty words usage in the last two columns. The Bad 
Weather coefficient is significantly positive only for CEOs without financial experience. The 
above results partially support a mitigating effect of financial knowledge on executive mood 
induced by poor weather conditions. 
7.2 Other Executive Characteristics 
We also look at three other dimensions of executives’ characteristics –tenure, gender, and 
age – which previous research (Davis et al., 2015) shows can influence managerial behavior 
                                                            
21 We use the definition of a financial related role as in Custodio and Metzger (2014). We focus on top-tier auditing 
firms: Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Coopers, Peat Marwick, and Touche 
Ross. In an alternative measure of financial expertise, we find similar untabulated results using CEOs with MBA 
degrees according to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Ulrike and Tate (2005). 
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during earnings conference calls. We use a similar strategy as above by separating our sample 
into two subgroups and examining any differences. For numerical characteristics (e.g. age, 
tenure), we use the top quartile point of the characteristic as the cut-off to separate each 
subgroup.  
Previous research shows that women tend to exhibit less overconfidence and are less 
optimistic than men (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974; Price, 1993; Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007). 
We therefore expect female executives will be less affected by weather conditions. In terms of 
tenure, we use the number of years that an executive has served in the firm. For age, we simply 
use the actual age of executives from Execucomp. We predict longer tenure (old age) will 
decrease the weather effect since managers with more experience may adjust their tone 
accordingly. The results are displayed in Table 11.22 
[Insert Table 11] 
In the first set of comparisons in Table 11, we examine net tone by manager characteristic 
and weather conditions. The results show that a manager’s tone is affected by bad weather 
positively (negatively) when the executive is relatively new to the firm (has been with the firm 
for a longer period of time). The result is similar for age as old CEOs are more affected by the 
weather than young CEOs. These results are counter to our prediction that longer tenured CEOs 
(older CEOs) are better able to resist weather-induced mood effects. One possible explanation is 
that the weather effect is unconscious (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). When an individual is more 
familiar with his or her working environment or job responsibility, the unconscious effect of 
weather on mood may be stronger. Compared to male managers, female manager tone is 
                                                            
22 We also test % Numbers in the Q&A section by individual executive but none of the coefficient differences are 
statistically significant. Due to the space constraints, we do not report these results in Table 11. 
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positively affected by weather conditions. This is consistent with our prediction. In the second 
set of comparisons, we switch our focus to uncertainty words usage. We only observe significant 
result for gender in which female managers speak with less uncertainty than male managers 
when weather is bad.23  
7.3 Post-earnings Announcement Drift 
Our final analysis considers weather effects on post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). 
PEAD reflects the tendency of a stock’s cumulative returns to consistently drift in the direction 
of an earnings surprise in the weeks following an earnings announcement date (Ball and Brown, 
1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1990). Previous research demonstrates that the tone of disclosure 
after an earnings announcement also influences PEAD (Feldman et al. 2010). Optimism or 
pessimism levels of a manager can also cause return to drift for a longer time period. As weather 
conditions will decrease a manager’s view about the firm’s future, we predict that poor weather 
conditions will decrease PEAD. 
In Table 12 we use a similar regression model as equation (2) but add an interaction term 
between our Bad Weather indicator and Surprise Earnings. For the measurement of PEAD, we 
use the cumulative abnormal return in [2,30], [2,45] and [2,60] day windows after the earnings 
conference call. 
[Insert Table 12] 
As seen in Table 12, baseline PEAD is observed through positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for Surprise Earnings in columns (1) through (3). The coefficients for Bad Weather 
                                                            
23 In unreported results, we also examine the role of managerial characteristics for individual executives (CEO or 
CFO). We find that male CEOs speak with more uncertainty words and more negative net tone than female CEOs 
during bad weather. All the other executive role-based differences in managerial characteristics are insignificant. 
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are negative and statistically significant across all specifications. These negative and significant 
results indicate that bad weather on the earnings call date will decrease PEAD after controlling 
for net tone and numerical content. Importantly, we see that the interaction term between Bad 
Weather and Surprise Earnings is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
result suggests that managerial mood-changes induced by bad weather also significantly change 
market interpretation of earnings surprises.  
8. Conclusion 
We examine the relationship between weather conditions and managerial behavior during 
earnings conference calls. We find that bad weather decreases net tone and quantitative 
information and increases the percentage of uncertainty words used by executives during 
earnings conference calls. This relationship can be attributed to weather effects on managerial 
mood. To be specific, bad weather makes managers more pessimistic about a firm's future and 
thus, they use a more negative tone, less precise information, and more uncertain language 
during earnings conference calls. 
We further look at individual executive roles to confirm whether financial expertise 
mitigates behavioral bias induced by weather conditions. We find that, unlike CEOs, CFO 
behavior is not affected by weather conditions. This result is consistent with previous research 
(Chen et al., 2017b). We also confirm our result by examining a subsample of CEOs with prior 
experience in financial roles. We find that call content from these executives is not affected by 
weather conditions. In addition, we also consider other characteristics of executives. We find 
short-tenured and female executives are less affected by weather-induced mood changes. 
We also examine market reactions to weather-induced behavior and find lower firm stock 
returns following earnings conference calls held during poor weather conditions. We then use the 
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Sobel test to confirm net tone and percentage of numbers as two mediators in this relationship. In 
our robustness checks, we confirm that our results are not driven by investor mood or states 
where large numbers of firms are headquartered. In our PEAD analysis, we find significantly 
negative results which suggest that investors should consider weather conditions as a factor when 
they are evaluating managerial behavior during earnings conference calls.  
Finally, we find that the coefficient for bad weather is still significant, albeit with a slightly 
smaller absolute value, after controlling for net tone (20% reduction) and percentage of numbers 
(3%) within an earnings conference call. Existing research has determined that the market reacts 
not only to the content of the call but to vocal cues from managers (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 
2012). Future research might explore other components or factors inside earnings conference 
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This table presents summary statistics for all variables in our sample. The sample period is 2006-2017. 
Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99% level. 
VARIABLES N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Dcloud Cover 57,374 0.021 2.593 -1.913 -0.722 1.726 
Accruals 57,374 0.004 0.105 0.000 0.016 0.044 
Afternoon 57,374 0.357 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Bad Weather 57,374 0.502 0.500 0 1 1 
Book to Market 57,374 0.566 0.477 0.254 0.466 0.766 
CARs[-1,1] 57,369 0.105 8.218 -4.038 0.045 4.299 
CEO Attend 57,374 0.723 0.447 0 1 1 
CFO Attend 57,374 0.673 0.469 0 1 1 
Dcloud Cover in NYC 56,282 1.118 2.629 -1.113 0.328 3.375 
Financial Expert CEO 57,374 0.108 0.310 0 0 0 
Ln(Analysts) 57,374 1.991 0.857 1.386 2.079 2.639 
Ln(Revisions) 57,374 0.084 0.433 0.000 0.057 0.330 
Ln(Size) 57,374 7.411 1.929 6.019 7.387 8.697 
Meet Expectation 57,374 0.678 0.467 0 1 1 
Momentum 57,374 0.126 0.458 -0.144 0.086 0.321 
Negative Earnings 57,374 0.189 0.391 0 0 0 
Net Tone in Q&A 57,374 0.687 0.668 0.248 0.670 1.103 
Net Tone from CEO 41,171 0.849 0.863 0.292 0.803 1.355 
Net Tone from CFO 36,005 0.388 1.019 -0.060 0.326 0.952 
% Numbers in Q&A 57,374 1.467 0.709 0.960 1.369 1.878 
% Numbers from CEO 41,172 1.286 0.822 0.699 1.149 1.728 
% Numbers from CFO 36,013 2.378 1.891 1.187 1.988 3.106 
% Uncertainty in Q&A 57,374 0.911 0.364 0.659 0.879 1.126 
% Uncertainty from CEO  41,171 0.868 0.456 0.559 0.819 1.122 
% Uncertainty from CFO 36,005 0.959 0.746 0.472 0.855 1.304 
PEAD [2,30] 57,153 0.180 11.900 -5.871 -0.057 5.644 
PEAD [2,45] 57,155 0.026 15.420 -7.627 -0.207 7.168 
PEAD [2,60] 57,155 0.001 0.046 0.000 0.009 0.020 
Return on Asset 57,374 0.784 3.160 -0.489 0.363 1.830 
Surprise Earnings 57,374 0.784 3.160 -0.489 0.363 1.830 
Total Words 57,374 6,473 2,125 4,868 6,484 8,007 
Total Words in Pre 57,374 3,784 1,746 2,469 3,707 4,966 






This table shows univariate analyses for major variables in our sample. We separate our sample into two groups 
according to the deseasonalized cloud cover around the headquarters of the company during the date of each 
earnings conference call. Bad weather equals one when the deseasonalized cloud cover is larger than the median 
level in our sample.  Panel A presents the comparison of variables related to conference calls. Panel B lists all 
non-textual variables. Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I.  Significance level: *** 
p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
  Bad Weather=1 Bad Weather=0     
VARIABLES N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Diff T-stats 
Panel A: Textual Variables 
Net Tone in Q&A 28,801 0.658 0.671 28,573 0.716 0.663 -0.058*** -10.414 
% Numbers in Q&A 28,801 1.436 0.708 28,573 1.497 0.709 -0.061*** -10.311 
% Uncertainty in Q&A 28,801 0.926 0.365 28,573 0.896 0.361 0.030*** 9.898 
Net Tone from CEO  19,137 0.826 0.870 22,034 0.870 0.857 -0.044*** -5.154 
% Numbers from CEO  19,138 1.261 0.826 22,034 1.308 0.818 -0.047*** -5.785 
% Uncertainty from CEO 19,137 0.883 0.464 22,034 0.856 0.448 0.027*** 5.984 
Net Tone from CFO in Q&A 16,648 0.381 1.014 19,357 0.394 1.024 -0.013 -1.207 
% Numbers from CFO  16,654 2.364 1.890 19,359 2.390 1.892 -0.026 -1.301 
% Uncertainty from CFO 16,648 0.971 0.743 19,357 0.950 0.749 0.021*** 2.664 
Total Words 28,801 6,520 2,133 28,573 6,427 2,115 93.000*** 5.244 
Total Words in Pre 28,801 3,808 1,746 28,573 3,760 1,746 48.000*** 3.292 
Total Words in Q&A 28,801 2,701 1,327 28,573 2,682 1,322 19.000*** 1.718 
Panel B: Non-Textual Variables 
Accruals  28,801  0.007 0.101  28,573  0.001 0.109 0.006*** 7.145 
Afternoon  28,801  0.334 0.472  28,573  0.380 0.485 -0.046*** -11.512 
Book to Market  28,801  0.592 0.494  28,573  0.539 0.458 0.053*** 13.327 
CARs [-1,1]  28,798  0.096 8.230  28,571  0.114 8.206 -0.018 -0.259 
CEO Attend  28,801  0.671 0.470  28,573  0.777 0.417 -0.106*** -28.580 
CFO Attend  28,801  0.620 0.485  28,573  0.727 0.445 -0.107*** -27.538 
Financial Expert CEO  28,801  0.109 0.311  28,573  0.107 0.309 0.002 0.773 
Ln (Analysts)  28,801  1.991 0.850  28,573  1.991 0.864 0.000 0.000 
Ln (Revisions)  28,801  0.096 0.426  28,573  0.071 0.439 0.025*** 6.949 
Ln (Size)  28,801  7.444 1.923  28,573  7.379 1.935 0.065*** 4.036 
Meet Expectation  28,801  0.682 0.466  28,573  0.673 0.469 0.009*** 2.306 
Momentum  28,801  0.111 0.462  28,573  0.141 0.454 -0.030*** -7.845 
Negative Earnings  28,801  0.178 0.383  28,573  0.199 0.399 -0.021*** -6.430 
PEAD [2,30]  28,695  0.099 12.060  28,458  0.262 11.730 -0.163 -1.634 
PEAD [2,45]  28,697  -0.049 15.480  28,458  0.102 15.370 -0.151 -1.169 
PEAD [2,60]  28,697  -0.382 18.820  28,458  -0.469 18.520 0.087 0.557 
Return on Asset  28,801  0.002 0.044  28,573  0.000 0.047 0.003*** 7.015 




Weather and Managerial Mood 
This table shows multiple regression results for the relationship between weather conditions and managerial mood. We use three variables in the 
earnings conference call transcripts to represent managerial mood: net tone, percentage of numbers spoken, and percentage of uncertainty words. For 
columns (1), (3) and (5), we only add firm and calendar quarter fixed effect to determinate the base relationship between bad weather and each 
dependent variable. We add control variables, which are described in Appendix I, in columns (2), (4) and (6). Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Net Tone in 
Q&A 
Net Tone in 
Q&A 
% Numbers in 
Q&A 
% Numbers in 
Q&A 
% Uncertainty in 
Q&A 
% Uncertainty in 
Q&A  
  
      
Bad Weather -0.059*** -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.027*** 0.030*** 0.021***  







































































































































Constant 0.705*** -0.184** 1.522*** 0.577*** 0.913*** 1.385***  
(156.298) (-2.161) (317.110) (6.331) (360.551) (32.279)        
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 57,374 57,374 57,374 57,374 57,374 57,374 




Weather and Market Reaction 
This table shows multiple regression results for the relationship between weather conditions and 
cumulative abnormal return (-1 to +1 day) around each earnings conference call date. We include only 
Bad Weather, fixed effects, and control variables in column (1). For column (2), we add management net 
tone in the earnings call transcript Q&A. We further add the percentage of numbers in each transcript as 
an additional control variable in column (3). Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I. Significance 
level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] 
  
   
Bad Weather -0.261*** -0.211*** -0.208***  
(-3.728) (-3.032) (-2.980) 
Net Tone in Q&A 
 
1.347*** 1.356***   
(19.067) (19.074) 
% Numbers in Q&A 
  
0.119*    
(1.808) 
Ln (Size) -0.989*** -1.168*** -1.184***  
(-8.977) (-10.538) (-10.627) 
Book to Market 1.441*** 1.601*** 1.614***  
(7.802) (8.629) (8.683) 
Return on Assets 11.869*** 11.517*** 11.526***  
(5.722) (5.560) (5.567) 
Surprise Earnings 0.447*** 0.433*** 0.433***  
(23.131) (22.574) (22.569) 
Ln (Analysts) -0.569*** -0.509*** -0.511***  
(-4.719) (-4.190) (-4.210) 
Ln (Revisions) 0.338*** 0.477*** 0.480***  
(2.749) (3.888) (3.918) 
Meet Expectations 2.916*** 2.813*** 2.815***  
(27.003) (26.327) (26.342) 
Negative Earnings -0.045 -0.042 -0.041  
(-0.262) (-0.248) (-0.244) 
Afternoon -0.287 -0.222 -0.224  
(-1.635) (-1.267) (-1.279) 
Accruals -3.640*** -3.526*** -3.528***  
(-4.254) (-4.109) (-4.113) 
Momentum -1.623*** -1.772*** -1.773***  
(-15.410) (-16.796) (-16.815) 
Constant 6.181*** 6.431*** 6.362***  
(7.632) (7.915) (7.824)     
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Firm FE YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 57,369 57,369 57,369 





Mediation Test for Managerial Tone and Number Usage 
This table shows the mediation test among weather, managerial tone (managerial numbers usage), and 
market reaction. We employ a Sobel test to identify whether the effect of weather on market reaction is 
through managerial tone or number usage in Q&A section. Panel A displays a graph to show the 
mediation relationship. We also introduce the basic steps to implicate the Sobel test in panel B. The 
results are shown in panel C. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
Panel A: A Graph for Mediation Relationship 
 
Panel B: Steps for Sobel Test 
Steps  Description 
1st 
Path A: Run a regression analysis with the weather variable predicting the mediator 
(managerial tone or managerial number usage) and calculate the coefficient and standard 
errors for the mediator (𝛼𝑎, 𝜎𝑎) 
2nd 
Path B: Run a regression analysis with the weather variable and mediator predicting the 











Panel C: Sobel Test Results 
Mediator Net Tone % Numbers 
Path  A B A B 
Coefficient -0.037 1.347 -0.027 0.119 
Std Dev 0.005 0.071 0.005 0.066 
Sobel Test -6.894*** --1.710* 











Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports our main regression analysis based on a sample in which earnings conference calls held 
in bad weather is matched to calls held in good weather. We use one-to-one match without replacement. 
We successfully find a match for 26,356 earnings conference calls in bad weather which represents 
approximate 92% percent of our original earnings calls in bad weather. Panel A shows our logit model to 
determine the score. Panel B lists our matched sample statistics. The regression results for the matched 
sample are shown in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I.  Significance level: *** p 
< 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
Panel A: Prediction Model 
  (1) 
Dependent Variable Bad Weather   
Ln (Size) -0.023***  
(-3.668) 
Book to Market 0.210***  
(10.667) 
Return on Assets 0.445  
(1.237) 
Surprise Earnings -0.003  
(-0.863) 
Ln (Analysts) 0.016  
(1.206) 
Ln (Revisions) 0.116***  
(5.816) 
Meet Expectations 0.058***  
(2.582) 
Negative Earnings -0.086***  
(-3.045) 
Accruals -0.173***  
(-9.486) 
Momentum 0.307**  
(2.025) 
Afternoon -0.112***  
(-5.759) 
Constant -0.044  
(-0.986)   
Quarter FE YES 
Observations 57,374 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00666 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics for Matched Sample 
Variables Treated Control %bias t-statistics p-value 
Ln (Size) 7.428 7.429 -0.100 -0.06 0.95 
Book to Market 0.558 0.557 0.200 0.21 0.836 
Return on Assets 0.002 0.002 0.300 0.31 0.754 
Surprise Earnings 0.792 0.792 0.000 0.00 0.996 
Ln (Analysts) 1.999 1.996 0.300 0.34 0.732 
Ln (Revisions) 0.082 0.084 -0.500 -0.60 0.549 
Meet Expectations 0.680 0.679 0.200 0.24 0.808 
Negative Earnings 0.182 0.183 -0.100 -0.17 0.866 
Accruals 0.356 0.351 0.900 1.04 0.299 
Momentum 0.006 0.006 0.600 0.69 0.492 
Afternoon 0.128 0.128 0.000 -0.03 0.975 
N 26356 26356 
   
 
Panel C: Regression Result for Balanced Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Net Tone in 
Q&A 
% Numbers in 
Q&A 




   
 
Bad Weather -0.037*** -0.025*** 0.021*** -0.237***  
(-6.888) (-4.480) (7.008) (-3.237) 
Net Tone 
   
1.339***     
(18.076) 
% Numbers 
   
0.119*     
(1.727) 
Ln(Size) 0.135*** 0.134*** -0.073*** -1.153***  
(11.444) (10.493) (-11.917) (-9.793) 
Book to Market -0.122*** -0.104*** 0.039*** 1.496***  
(-8.002) (-6.382) (5.209) (7.633) 
Return on Assets 0.280** -0.104 0.121* 10.960***  
(2.187) (-0.839) (1.709) (5.025) 
Surprise Earnings 0.011*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.446***  
(9.546) (0.723) (-2.486) (22.541) 
Ln(Analysts) -0.039*** 0.018 0.019*** -0.545***  
(-3.559) (1.475) (3.113) (-4.310) 
Ln(Revisions) -0.101*** -0.020* 0.020*** 0.502***  
(-10.303) (-1.955) (3.595) (3.998) 
Meet Expectations 0.075*** -0.014* 0.000 2.796***  
(10.573) (-1.904) (0.040) (25.638) 




(0.025) (-0.105) (-1.604) (0.092) 
Afternoon -0.048*** 0.018 0.006 -0.319*  
(-2.885) (0.993) (0.604) (-1.706) 
Accruals -0.100* 0.033 0.079*** -3.578***  
(-1.832) (0.585) (2.606) (-3.968) 
Momentum 0.112*** 0.004 -0.009** -1.771***  
(15.020) (0.530) (-2.237) (-15.452) 
Constant -0.204** 0.546*** 1.399*** 6.335***  
(-2.375) (5.874) (31.816) (7.387)     
 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 52,712 52,712 52,712 52,712 





Asymmetric Weather Effect 
This table examines asymmetric weather effects of both managers’ behavior and market reaction. We use both Better Weather which accounts for 
the bottom quartile in our deseasonalized cloud cover variable and Worse Weather for the top quartile. The first three columns report the three 
manager behavior variables in the Q&A section during earnings conference calls (net tone, percentage of numbers spoken, and percentage of 
uncertainty words spoken). The last two columns focus on the market reaction to these two weather indicator variables. Detailed definitions for 
each variable are provided in Appendix I.  Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p 
< 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Net Tone in Q&A % Numbers in Q&A % Uncertainty in Q&A CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] 
            
Better Weather 0.009 0.003 -0.011*** 0.119 0.106 
 (1.525) (0.542) (-3.157) (1.385) (1.239) 
Worse Weather -0.038*** -0.032*** 0.017*** -0.154* -0.098 
 (-6.241) (-4.949) (4.807) (-1.840) (-1.174) 
Net Tone 
    
1.357*** 
 
    
(19.077) 
% Numbers 
    
0.120* 
 
    
(1.826) 
Ln (Size) 0.131*** 0.127*** -0.070*** -0.984*** -1.178*** 
 (11.265) (10.066) (-11.594) (-8.890) (-10.503) 
Book to Market -0.118*** -0.103*** 0.036*** 1.438*** 1.609*** 
 (-7.870) (-6.786) (5.156) (7.779) (8.654) 
Return on Assets 0.262** -0.106 0.100 11.875*** 11.528*** 
 (2.174) (-0.870) (1.479) (5.724) (5.567) 
Surprise Earnings 0.010*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.447*** 0.433*** 
 (9.552) (0.552) (-2.474) (23.131) (22.567) 
Ln (Analysts) -0.044*** 0.024** 0.019*** -0.569*** -0.512*** 
 (-4.040) (2.034) (3.296) (-4.718) (-4.214) 
Ln (Revisions) -0.104*** -0.023** 0.021*** 0.334*** 0.477*** 
 (-11.019) (-2.335) (3.982) (2.721) (3.895) 
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Meet Expectations 0.076*** -0.018** -0.002 2.916*** 2.814*** 
 (11.170) (-2.503) (-0.392) (27.008) (26.345) 
Negative Earnings -0.002 -0.004 -0.013* -0.043 -0.040 
 (-0.161) (-0.295) (-1.937) (-0.251) (-0.235) 
Afternoon -0.048*** 0.020 0.008 -0.289* -0.226 
 (-3.051) (1.138) (0.903) (-1.646) (-1.287) 
Accruals -0.082 0.027 0.091*** -3.638*** -3.530*** 
 (-1.570) (0.507) (3.193) (-4.252) (-4.114) 
Momentum 0.111*** 0.005 -0.009** -1.621*** -1.772*** 
 (15.345) (0.641) (-2.404) (-15.386) (-16.796) 
Constant -0.179** 0.584*** 1.388*** 6.033*** 6.206*** 
 (-2.110) (6.380) (32.180) (7.406) (7.580) 
      
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 57,374 57,374 57,374 57,369 57,369 






This table reports robustness checks for our regression results. To rule out investor sentiment, we focus on large firms which have been shown to 
have more diversified investor bases and the weather in New York City where most trading takes place. These results are listed in columns (1) and 
(2), respectively. The last set of analyses focus on the concern that our results are driven by some large states. We separate our sample into two 
subsamples based on firm headquarters located in one of the three largest states (NY, CA and TX) that have the most firms. These two subsample 
results are shown in columns (3) and (4). Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I.  Standard errors are clustered by firm 
and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Large Firm Subsample NYC Weather Not NY,CA,TX NY,CA,TX 
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] CAR [-1,1] 
  
    
Bad Weather -0.189** -0.160** -0.184** -0.248**  
(-2.293) (-2.145) (-2.115) (-2.135) 
Net Tone 1.178*** 1.345*** 1.318*** 1.421***  
(13.242) (18.727) (14.741) (12.130) 
% Numbers -0.087 0.117* 0.154* 0.045  
(-1.054) (1.754) (1.859) (0.421) 







Ln(Size) -1.047*** -1.174*** -1.221*** -1.132***  
(-7.036) (-10.367) (-8.110) (-6.909) 
Book to Market 1.261*** 1.605*** 1.468*** 1.851***  
(5.303) (8.563) (5.967) (6.628) 
Return on Assets 13.040*** 11.549*** 8.272*** 15.369***  
(3.343) (5.498) (2.904) (5.093) 
Surprise Earnings 0.414*** 0.435*** 0.438*** 0.424***  
(17.036) (22.377) (18.275) (13.336) 
Ln(Analysts) -0.654*** -0.526*** -0.437*** -0.631***  
(-4.053) (-4.310) (-2.736) (-3.393) 
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Ln(Revisions) 0.707*** 0.448*** 0.469*** 0.494***  
(4.739) (3.645) (2.890) (2.666) 
Meet Expectations 2.007*** 2.801*** 2.748*** 2.931***  
(16.332) (25.936) (20.741) (16.231) 
Negative Earnings 0.284 -0.053 -0.281 0.294  
(1.113) (-0.313) (-1.251) (1.146) 
Afternoon -0.411** -0.204 -0.242 -0.156  
(-1.966) (-1.166) (-1.134) (-0.509) 
Accruals -3.216* -3.519*** -3.528*** -3.599***  
(-1.833) (-4.073) (-3.036) (-2.836) 
Momentum -1.909*** -1.770*** -1.943*** -1.515***  
(-14.204) (-16.658) (-14.934) (-8.637) 
Constant 8.516*** 6.355*** 6.821*** 5.664***  
(6.440) (7.701) (6.137) (4.775)      
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,301 56,277 35,784 21,585 





Weather and Individual Executive’s Mood 
This table shows multiple regression results for the relationship between weather conditions and individual executive's mood. We use three variables in the Q&A 
section of earnings conference call transcripts to represent mood for CEO and CFO: net tone, percent of number spoken, and percentage of uncertainty words 
spoken. For columns (1), (2) and (3), we focus on CEO's behavior change. In column (4), (5), and (6), we switch our focus to CFO. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in Appendix I. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * 
p < 0:1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Net Tone from 
CEO 
% Numbers from 
CEO 
% Uncertainty from 
CEO 
Net Tone from 
CFO 
% Numbers from 
CFO 
% Uncertainty from 
CFO 
              
Bad Weather -0.017** -0.025*** 0.015*** -0.001 -0.004 0.007 
 (-2.133) (-3.353) (3.444) (-0.066) (-0.184) (0.792) 
CFO Attends 0.107*** -0.063*** -0.021** 
   
 (5.992) (-3.283) (-2.379) 
   
CEO Attends 
   
0.043* 0.044 -0.031* 
 
   
(1.649) (0.969) (-1.661) 
Ln (Size) 0.107*** 0.094*** -0.059*** 0.068*** 0.002 -0.076*** 
 (6.357) (5.569) (-6.860) (2.681) (0.048) (-5.289) 
Book to Market -0.103*** -0.125*** 0.049*** -0.106*** -0.086* 0.040** 
 (-4.948) (-5.623) (4.550) (-3.778) (-1.678) (2.276) 
Return on Assets 0.223 -0.092 0.088 0.746*** -0.455 0.088 
 (1.283) (-0.545) (0.887) (2.607) (-0.934) (0.403) 
Surprise Earnings 0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 0.013*** 0.004 -0.000 
 (4.972) (-0.712) (-1.348) (5.920) (1.045) (-0.272) 
Ln (Analysts) -0.092*** 0.026* 0.026*** -0.012 0.019 0.037** 
 (-5.863) (1.667) (3.016) (-0.604) (0.463) (2.570) 
Ln (Revisions) -0.090*** -0.010 0.021*** -0.059*** 0.047 0.025* 
 (-6.382) (-0.767) (2.667) (-2.978) (1.301) (1.726) 
Meet Expectations 0.078*** -0.010 0.001 0.058*** -0.016 0.001 
 (7.295) (-1.038) (0.089) (3.898) (-0.594) (0.080) 
Negative Earnings -0.024 0.004 -0.010 0.030 -0.030 -0.028 
 (-1.415) (0.221) (-1.088) (1.271) (-0.673) (-1.538) 
Afternoon -0.041* 0.028 0.007 -0.088*** 0.084 -0.004 
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 (-1.778) (1.243) (0.586) (-2.798) (1.473) (-0.197) 
Accruals -0.115 0.091 0.100** 0.037 0.382* 0.150 
 (-1.518) (1.316) (2.490) (0.294) (1.682) (1.563) 
Momentum 0.073*** -0.014 0.009* 0.048*** 0.020 -0.003 
 (6.716) (-1.351) (1.762) (3.371) (0.712) (-0.287) 
Constant 0.186 0.698*** 1.245*** -0.096 2.363*** 1.480*** 
 (1.530) (5.673) (20.493) (-0.525) (7.026) (14.313) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 41,171 41,172 41,171 36,005 36,013 36,005 






Financial Expertise of CEO and Weather-Induced Behavioral Change 
This table shows multiple regression results for the influence of financial expertise on weather-induced behavioral change during earnings 
conference calls. We use the financial expertise classifications similar to Custodio and Metzger (2014): CEO who has previous experience in a 
finance related role or has working experience in large auditing firms. For columns (1) and (2), we focus on the net tone in Q&A section from 
CEO. We focus on percentage of numbers usage in Q&A section from CEO in column (3) and (4). At last two column, we switch our focus to the 
uncertainty words usage. Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Detailed definitions for each variable are 
provided in Appendix I. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
 Financial Expert CEO 
Dependent Variable Net Tone in Q&A % Numbers in Q&A % Uncertainty in Q&A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 NO YES NO YES NO YES 
       
Bad Weather -0.012 -0.029 -0.031*** 0.021 0.017*** -0.003 
 (-1.480) (-1.387) (-3.983) (0.963) (3.579) (-0.227) 
CFO Attend 0.103*** 0.063 -0.037* -0.125** -0.021** -0.005 
 (5.297) (1.267) (-1.854) (-2.306) (-2.223) (-0.177) 
Ln(Size) 0.101*** 0.128*** 0.094*** 0.103* -0.057*** -0.052** 
 (5.579) (2.771) (5.317) (1.834) (-6.142) (-2.353) 
Book to Market -0.094*** -0.167*** -0.119*** -0.149*** 0.046*** 0.065** 
 (-4.178) (-2.770) (-4.978) (-2.741) (3.928) (2.105) 
Return on Assets 0.184 1.481* -0.106 0.082 0.087 -0.062 
 (1.036) (1.835) (-0.607) (0.124) (0.837) (-0.145) 
Surprise Earnings 0.008*** 0.009** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
 (4.602) (1.987) (-0.742) (0.043) (-1.378) (0.622) 
Ln(Analysts) -0.094*** -0.013 0.025 0.033 0.021** 0.034 
 (-5.606) (-0.243) (1.515) (0.722) (2.380) (1.109) 
Ln(Revisions) -0.090*** -0.099** -0.008 -0.013 0.019** 0.040 
 (-5.970) (-2.267) (-0.555) (-0.302) (2.425) (1.372) 
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Meet Expectations 0.074*** 0.110*** -0.020* 0.068** -0.000 -0.003 
 (6.446) (3.537) (-1.952) (2.394) (-0.004) (-0.158) 
Negative Earnings -0.035** 0.039 0.002 0.028 -0.012 0.032 
 (-1.982) (0.650) (0.091) (0.540) (-1.261) (1.054) 
Afternoon -0.035 0.012 0.004 0.161** 0.010 0.001 
 (-1.430) (0.175) (0.186) (2.069) (0.783) (0.019) 
Accruals -0.097 -0.584 0.084 0.006 0.082** 0.398 
 (-1.265) (-1.300) (1.187) (0.014) (2.020) (1.543) 
Momentum 0.072*** 0.083** -0.012 -0.036 0.009* 0.015 
 (6.376) (2.025) (-1.139) (-1.044) (1.669) (0.826) 
       
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 36,403 4,768 36,404 4,768 36,403 4,768 






Executive Characteristics on Weather-Induced Behavioral Change 
This table shows the influence of executive characteristics (age, tenure, and gender) on weather-induced behavioral change during earnings 
conference calls. For each characteristic, we divide our original sample into two subsamples according to the top quartile of each characteristic. 
For example, we define a long tenured executive as an executive whose tenure at the firm is above the top quartile (top 25%). The table transforms 
our original call level data into individual executive level data. We use the coefficient difference test developed by Paternoster et al. (1998) in our 
“Diff” column. We also highlight significant differences between each pair of coefficients. Detailed definitions for each variable are provided in 
Appendix I. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. 
Managers (CEOs and CFOs) 
Dependent Variable: Net Tone in Q&A 
 Tenure  Gender  Age  
 Short Long Diff Male Female Diff Young Old Diff 
Bad Weather 0.004 -0.039* 0.043*** -0.013 0.035 -0.048* 0.005 -0.027* 0.032* 
 (0.390) (-2.990) (2.591) (-1.594) (1.304) (-1.711) (0.525 (-1.815) (1.812) 
Controls & FEs YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
N 28,216 15,299  40,750 2,765  32,231 11,232  
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.434  0.319 0.577  0.349 0.460  
Dependent Variable: % Uncertainty in Q&A 
 Tenure  Gender  Age  
 Short Long Diff Male Female Diff Young Old Diff 
Bad Weather 0.005 0.012* -0.007 0.010*** -0.030** 0.040*** 0.005 0.005 0.000 
 (1.122) (2.263) (-1.011) (2.707) (-2.100) (2.71) (1.103) (0.754) (0.000) 
Controls & FEs YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  
N 28,216 15,299  32,231 11,232  40,750 2,765  






Weather and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
This table shows multiple regression results for weather conditions and post-earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD). We calculate PEAD as the cumulative abnormal return over three different timeframes. 
Variables Afternoon, Meet Expectation, Return on Asset and Ln (Analysts) are insignificant and included 
in additional controls. Standard errors are clustered by firm and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Detailed definitions for each variable is provided in Appendix I. Significance level: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 
0:05, * p < 0:1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PEAD [2,30] PEAD [2,45] PEAD [2,60] 
        
Surprise Earnings 0.082*** 0.101*** 0.090** 
 (3.197) (3.046) (2.264) 
Bad Weather -0.544*** -0.785*** -0.859*** 
 (-5.102) (-5.780) (-5.313) 
Surprise Earnings*Bad Weather -0.070** -0.115*** -0.137*** 
 (-2.161) (-2.766) (-2.696) 
Net Tone 0.516*** 0.650*** 0.809*** 
 (5.465) (5.250) (5.394) 
% Numbers 0.153 0.334*** 0.535*** 
 (1.554) (2.699) (3.627) 
Ln (Size) -0.480*** -1.353*** -2.121*** 
 (-3.045) (-6.618) (-8.241) 
Book to Market 4.123*** 6.101*** 7.826*** 
 (14.633) (16.878) (17.214) 
Ln (Reversion) -0.317* -0.199 -0.320 
 (-1.723) (-0.843) (-1.114) 
Negative Earning -0.386 -0.379 -0.654* 
 (-1.458) (-1.126) (-1.653) 
Accrual -1.242 -4.159** -8.803*** 
 (-0.869) (-2.349) (-4.135) 
Momentum -7.509*** -10.918*** -14.301*** 
 (-47.065) (-53.679) (-57.786) 
Constant 2.225* 7.728*** 13.092*** 
 (1.870) (5.020) (6.889) 
    
Additional Controls YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Quarter FE YES YES YES 
Observations 57,153 57,155 57,155 




Comparison Between Miami and Seattle 
This figure shows deseasonalized cloud cover comparison between Miami and Seattle to demonstrate the 
validity of the weather measurement that we construct. The first row shows histogram comparisons 
between these two cities and corresponding states. The second and third rows present the corresponding 
statistics for each histogram. 




Miami Seattle   
N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Difference T-statistic 
394 -0.145 1.670 497 -0.376 2.726 0.231 1.477 
        
State Comparison 
Florida State Washington State   
N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev Difference T-statistic 






Accruals Quarterly accruals over total assets. Accruals are defined as IBCY-
OANCFY using quarterly Compustat data 
Afternoon An indicator variable to distinguish between morning earnings 
conference call and afternoon earnings conference call 
Bad Weather An indicator variable equals one if the call date's seasonally adjusted 
cloud cover is larger than the median deseasonalized cloud cover in the 
whole sample 
Book to Market Book equity over market equity 
CAR [-1,1] Cumulative Abnormal Return from -1 days to +1 days around earnings 
conference call date 
CEO Attend An indicator variable equals one if CEO appears in the earnings 
conference call  
CFO Attend An indicator variable equals one if CFO appears in the earnings 
conference call 
Dcloud Cover Call date's cloud cover minus the average cloud cover in the same 
week of the year during the whole sample period 
Dcloud Cover in NYC Call date's deseasonalized cloud cover in New York City 
Large Firm A dummy variable equals one if the firm size is larger than the median 
firm size in the whole sample 
Ln(Analysts) Natural log of the number of analysts follows the firm during the 
quarter for the company 
Ln(Revisions) Natural log of the number of earnings estimate revisions by an analyst 
during the quarter for the company 
Ln(Size) Natural log of the firm's total asset 
Major State A dummy variable equals one if the firm is in one of the following 
states: NY, CA, and TX 
Meet Expectations A dummy variable equals one if the firm meets analyst expectation in 
that quarter 
Momentum Measured by lag cumulative 12-month returns. 
Negative Earnings A dummy variable equals one if the firm has negative earning in that 
quarter 
Net Tone from CEO The difference between the number of positive words and negative 
words said by CEO in Q&A section, scaled by the total number of 
words said by CEO in Q&A section. 
Net Tone from CFO The difference between the number of positive words and negative 
words said by CFO in Q&A section, scaled by the total number of 
words said by CFO in Q&A section. 
Net Tone in Q&A The difference between the number of positive words and negative 
words said by all executives in Q&A session, scaled by the total 
number of words said by all executives in Q&A session. 
PEAD [a, b] Post-earnings announcement drift as the accumulative abnormal return 
between day a and day b after the earnings conference call  
Return on Assets Net income over assets 
Surprise Earnings The difference between actual earnings and analysts’ forecast divided 
by the standard deviation of analyst forecast 
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Total Negative Words Total negative words in the earnings transcripts 
Total Positive Words Total positive words in the earnings transcripts 
Total Words Total words in the earnings transcripts 
Total Words in Pre Total words in presentation section of the earnings transcripts 
Total Words in Q&A Total words in Q&A section of the earnings transcripts 
% Numbers from CEO Total number of numeric phrases said by CEO in Q&A section, over 
the sum of the count of words and numbers said by CEO in Q&A 
section. 
% Numbers from CFO Total number of numeric phrases said by CFO in Q&A section, over 
the sum of the count of words and numbers said by CFO in Q&A 
section. 
% Numbers in Q&A Total number of numeric phrases spoken by managers in Q&A, over 
the sum of the count of words and numbers in Q&A. 
% Uncertainty in Q&A Total number of uncertainty words spoken by managers in Q&A, over 
the sum of the count of words in Q&A 
% Uncertainty from CEO Total number of uncertainty words said by CEO in Q&A section, over 
the sum of the count of words and numbers said by CEO in Q&A 
section. 
% Uncertainty from CFO Total number of uncertainty words said by CFO in Q&A section, over 
the sum of the count of words and numbers said by CFO in Q&A 
section. 
 
